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in a Sri Lankan MFI
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Abstract
This paper studies the accountability mechanisms and dynamics that exist 
within a microfinance context when microfinance officers (MFOs) interact 
with borrowers at the community level (MFO–community interface). In the Sri 
Lankan microfinance institution (MFI) used in this study, community units or 
clusters comprising of several peer or solidarity groups engage with MFOs in the 
field. Using Ritchie and Richardson’s (2000) accountability typologies (codified, 
contingent, assumed and collateral), this article explores how multiple and 
complex accountability relationships manifest at the MFO–community interface. 
The data collected from interviews, discussions, observations, document reviews 
and the primary researcher’s ref lective notes demonstrate that both codified 
and contingent accountability associations are evident for MFOs. Peer groups, 
however, demonstrate both collateral and contingent accountability associations, 
while clusters show assumed accountability associations. These different types 
of accountability have implications for the empowerment potential of MFIs.
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Introduction
In the microfinance context, a large number of organisations provide 
lending to the poor with the express aim of poverty alleviation through 
empowerment and active participation (Marini et al. 2017). Microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), in particular, provide small-scale financial services 
to those who have limited or no access to traditional banking services 
(Karlan & Goldberg 2011: 20). However, the pioneering Grameen Bank 
member-based model of serving the poor in Bangladesh has changed over 
time, with the emergence of more commercially oriented MFIs. These 
MFIs, which focus on financial performance and deliver microfinance 
loans at market-based interest rates (Christen 2001), have increasingly 
been criticised for profiting at the expense of the poor. For example, 
in the case of Banco Compartamos in Mexico and SKS Microfinance 
in India, the owners became instant millionaires by releasing shares at 
an extremely high price in their initial public offering (Rosenberg et al. 
2009; Chen et al. 2010; CGAP 2010). These two incidents and similar 
financial-focused practices accumulated into a potential ‘tipping point’ 
for microfinance stakeholders, and led to a debate about whether MFIs 
use the poor to enhance profitability, especially through high interest 
rates. This brings into question whether commercially oriented MFIs 
should be a part of priority sector subsidies, and whether donors should 
always assist commercially oriented MFIs during their establishment 
phase (Rosenberg 2007; Chen et al. 2010). The perceived lack of client-
centred practices raises concerns about MFI accountability relationships 
and the responsibility to deliver the objective of empowerment (and 
subsequent poverty alleviation).
The concept of accountability ref lects both being ‘held responsible’ 
and ‘taking responsibility’ for actions (Cornwall 2000). It is defined as:
. . . the means through which individuals and organizations are held 
externally to account for their actions and as the means by which 
they take internal responsibility for continuously shaping and scruti-
nizing organizational mission, goals, and performance (Ebrahim 
2003b: 194).
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Within the MFI context, institutions are responsible for and to multiple 
stakeholders, therefore different types of accountability relationships 
have emerged and are well defined in the literature. In terms of 
vertical relationships, downward accountability refers to an institution’s 
responsibility towards its beneficiaries (Ebrahim 2003b). Downward 
accountability is often framed within a power dynamic with an emphasis 
on beneficiary empowerment (Kilby 2006), while upward accountability 
refers to the responsibility to donors and funding agencies. It is often 
referred to as hierarchical, since accountability is often directed upward 
to a defined group of powerful stakeholders (Taylor et al. 2014). To 
counter unidirectional responsibility, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) 
refer to a more holistic style that combines the interests of various 
stakeholders in both upward and downward relationships, allowing for 
alternative forms of accountability. This may also include a range of 
methods or models, such as oral or visual forms of giving an account.
At a horizontal or relational level, internal accountability refers to 
the commitment of an organisation to its institutional values (Ebrahim 
2003a, 2003b). Sometimes referred to as identity accountability, it 
focuses on the integrity or values and mission of the organisation to its 
beneficiaries, since it allows organisational management, rather than the 
donors, to scope the boundaries of responsibility (O’Dwyer & Unerman 
2008; Taylor et al. 2014). In practice, however, these accountability 
relationships manifest in complex ways. For example, reporting to donors 
and funders is often given priority over the needs of borrowers (Dixon 
et al. 2006; Walsh 2016), especially in circumstances where foreign 
sourced-funding exists (Mir & Bala 2015). Accountability, therefore, is 
always relational and contextual, and more often operationalised and 
practised in the field (Marini et al. 2017).
Given the controversial nature of commercially oriented MFIs, 
this article focuses on accountability relationships at the level where 
the MFI representatives interact with borrowers. With regard to how 
accountability manifests at the borrower interface, it explores how 
microfinance officers (MFO) interact with community groups (clusters), 
and how members of these groups engage with each other (peer or 
solidarity groups). Since this study involves a Sri Lankan commercial 
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MFI, the following section introduces the Sri Lankan microfinance 
sector, before a description of the MFI and its lending model. This is 
followed by a discussion of the relevant literature on empowerment 
and accountability, and the introduction of the analytical framework 
of accountability used in the study. It found that multiple dimensions 
of accountability exist at the MFO–community level of engagement, 
and the article concludes with a discussion of these findings and their 
implications for empowerment.
Background: Sri Lanka and the Hope 
Microfinance Institute (HMI)1
Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income country with 20.7 million people, 
of whom 77% live in rural areas (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2015; World 
Bank 2015). Although the finance sector is dominated by banks following 
the Sri Lankan financial sector’s deregulation in 1977 (Charitonenko & 
De Silva 2002), the country has a versatile microfinance sector. A number 
of institutions provide microfinance services; these include cooperatives, 
such as the Cooperative Rural Banks; Thrift and Credit Cooperative 
Societies (TCCSs) (later revitalised as SANASA – the Sinhalese acronym 
for TCCSs); non-government organisations (NGOs); state-sponsored 
institutions; banks; and finance companies (World Bank 2006; Atapattu 
2009; GTZ ProMiS 2010).
This case study involves an NGO-MFI limited by guarantee, HMI.2 
According to the institution’s 2014 annual report, HMI envisions creating 
an equitable and empowered society and alleviating poverty. HMI has 
eighteen branches in four provinces (out of Sri Lanka’s nine), and serves 
more than 70,000 borrowers with an outstanding loan portfolio of SLR 
1.64 billion (Sri Lankan rupees). The portfolio-at-risk is estimated at 
1.33% for one day and 0.8% for 30 days.3 For the period of the study 
(2014), HMI employed 215 staff.
HMI’s head office and branches have different functions. According 
to operational guidelines, a typical HMI branch has four or five MFOs, 
an enterprise development officer (EDO), two officers for administrative 
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and accounting functions, and a branch manager. MFOs’ roles and 
responsibilities include forming community-based borrower groups, 
conducting loan assessments, disbursing microfinance loans and 
collecting loan instalments. Thus, MFOs are in direct contact with 
community borrowers. Similarly, EDOs arrange and sometimes deliver 
enterprise-related services. The administrative and accounting functions 
are handled by two office-based staff at branch level. Branch managers 
oversee all field and branch level activities and report to one of four area 
managers, who in turn report to an operations manager at HMI’s head 
office, in Colombo. The head office also undertakes human resource, 
financial and information management functions.
HMI uses cluster-based lending to deliver credit services. This lending 
model is grounded in solidarity principles, where a group rather than an 
individual is responsible for loan repayment. This model closely resembles 
the lending mechanism used in the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Figure 
1 provides an illustration of HMI’s credit delivery model.
Figure 1 HMI’s credit delivery model
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A cluster is an unregistered, community-based unit that acts as an 
intermediary for loan collection. A cluster has around eight to ten peer 
groups, i.e. three members who guarantee each other’s loans. MFOs 
visit these clusters once a month and collect individual loan instalments. 
One MFO has around 30 to 33 clusters. Thus, a branch usually has 120 
to 165 clusters. HMI’s 2014 annual report highlights that, on average, 
there is a caseload of 750 borrowers per MFO.
Within this context, MFOs have the role of operationalising HMI’s 
development objectives, particularly empowerment, through their 
engagement with microfinance borrowers participating in cluster 
meetings. Hence, within an NGO-MFI setting, such as HMI, MFOs have 
to conduct activities beyond loan-related tasks to ensure empowerment 
and participation. The next section defines and examines the concepts 
of empowerment and participation in NGOs and NGO-type MFIs.
Empowerment and participation
In the development literature, empowerment and active participation are 
foundational concepts in sustainable poverty alleviation. Empowerment, 
within a microfinance context, is defined in terms of the engagement of 
the poor in income-generating activities (i.e. economic empowerment) 
(Saidu et al. 2014), increased access to power and resources at both 
community and household levels (i.e. social empowerment) (Torri 
& Martinez 2014), and involvement in political/legal activities (i.e. 
political empowerment) (Nawaz 2014). To achieve these goals, MFIs 
emphasise participatory decision-making and regular interactions with 
microfinance groups (Saidu et al. 2014; Bawole & Langnel 2016; Orso 
& Fabrizi 2016).
However, not all of these community/beneficiary participation 
initiatives have resulted in positive outcomes. For example, Bawole 
and Langnel (2016) found that community members who were not 
involved in the pre-planning of projects were not empowered, because 
the organisations had conceptualised specific projects with funders 
before visiting the beneficiary community. In addition, organisations 
often set the rules of participation and limited the role of the community 
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to endorsement of pre-prepared plans and prior decisions, and other 
mundane aspects of projects. Thus, beneficiaries became passive rather 
than active participants (Bawole & Langnel 2016). Further reasons for 
the lack of community engagement include: the perception that shifting 
accountability to beneficiaries may weaken institutional control (Kilby 
2006); operational obstacles such as staff availability, leadership issues 
and the quality of staff and partners (Walsh 2016); local elites managing/
working in communities that under-represent the beneficiary group 
(O’Dwyer & Unerman 2010); and a hierarchical social order (i.e. caste 
or class) that limits the participation of certain community groups 
(Krösschell 2013).
In this study, we operationalise empowerment as entrepreneurship – 
that is, the ability of borrowers (mainly women) to start or develop a 
business by taking decisions, undertaking actions and navigating complex 
economic, social and MFI norms and practices. Microfinance services 
improve entrepreneurship outcomes, such as self-employment leading to 
business income, profit and investment in assets; social ties and networks; 
and participation in decision-making and bargaining power (Khandker et 
al. 1998; Attanasio et al. 2015; Augsburg et al. 2015; Banerjee et al. 2015; 
Crépon et al. 2015; Ranabahu 2017). These outcomes, specifically the 
ability to contribute to family welfare and raise self-esteem, enhance the 
potential for empowerment (Osmani 2007). Therefore, while economic 
empowerment is often foregrounded, aspects of social and political 
empowerment are also evident in entrepreneurial practices. However, as 
Kilby (2004) argues, to achieve these objectives, organisations should have 
some level of accountability to the beneficiaries they aim to empower. 
For example, formal and structured accountability mechanisms and 
processes are found to have stronger links with empowerment outcomes 
(Kilby 2006). In cases where empowerment is not an explicit goal, and 
therefore not embedded in formal processes, the institution is less likely 
achieve this in practice (Kilby 2004). In a previous study examining 
entrepreneurial decision-making in HMI (Ranabahu 2017), having a 
microfinance loan contributed to the skill-set needed for borrowers to 
develop into expert entrepreneurs. While this link to empowerment was 
evident, what was not clear was the role of cluster-level engagement and 
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accountability practices with MFOs. To examine this further and extend 
our understanding of empowerment, we focus on both vertical and 
horizontal accountability dimensions at the MFO–community interface. 
First, however, we discuss concepts of accountability, with particular 
attention given to the context of developing countries and MFIs.
Accountability
Accountability is concerned with ‘the giving and demanding of reasons for 
conduct’ (Roberts & Scapens 1985: 447). In a Western, capitalist context, 
accountability is linked to notions of responsible governance, stewardship 
and decision-useful information for economic decision-making. While 
both are enshrined in regulatory frameworks such as international 
accounting standards, they have been criticised as offering a partial 
economic perspective of accountability relationships (see Chwastiak 
1999). Therefore, accounting scholars have considered alternative 
perspectives to explore accountability, which reinforces the idea that 
the concept is complex, contextual, political and multidimensional. 
For example, critical theorists explore the hegemonic potential or 
exploitation in financial accounting that privileges shareholder needs. 
In addition, accounting scholars often adopt a broad definition of ‘an 
account’. Examples include ancient stone tablets (Vollmers 2009) or 
counter accounts produced by social activist groups (Moerman & van 
der Laan 2015). The acknowledgement that accountability is a contextual 
and multidimensional practice means that researchers must consider the 
field in which the study is conducted and the type of relationship that 
is mediated, and take a broader view to include a range of ‘accounts’. 
This is more than evident in the microfinance context, where formal 
and informal, verbal and non-verbal accounts are evidenced.
Accountability and microfinance
To date, the microfinance accountability literature has given prominence 
mainly to horizontal and vertical institutional-level accountability 
relationships. For example, Hartarska (2009) studied how control was 
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exercised by external stakeholders and how those practices impacted 
internal governance and accountability mechanisms. Ahmed and Khan 
(2016) examined formal governance mechanisms and financial reporting 
and disclosure within the Bangladeshi context and found that frequency 
of board of directors’ meetings and directors’ qualifications contribute 
to high levels of financial disclosure. Similarly, the client protection 
card introduced by a South African MFI to borrowers was ref lective 
of a downward accountability mechanism (Marini et al. 2017). Akanga 
(2017) studied institutionalised accountability practices in Cameroon 
and their impact on poverty alleviation. The author found that 
professional practices and bureaucratic structures introduced to manage 
accountability had resulted in MFIs counteracting these pressures by 
manipulating accounting systems, focusing operations into urban areas, 
and focusing only on short-term outcomes. Tanima and Brown (2016) 
found that oppressive social and organisational realities, such as class 
structure or authority or power of religious institutions, could slowly 
be transformed to create female empowerment through the creation of 
dynamic, collaborative and dialogic spaces in the Bangladeshi context.
Researchers have also focused on MFOs and their role in managing 
complex accountability mechanisms. Within the microfinance 
environment, Dixon et al. (2006) found that, on the one hand, loan 
officers represent institutional interests for timely loan payments, while 
also balancing both vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (relational) 
accountabilities. Hence, these loan officers perform multiple, ambiguous 
and changeable roles, and often act as ‘debt collectors’ to protect their 
own interests at the expense of being the participative community 
‘facilitators’ required by the MFI (Siwale & Ritchie 2011). As these 
studies demonstrate, MFOs are often managing or balancing competing 
accountabilities (Dixon et al. 2007; Siwale & Ritchie 2011). Therefore, 
within a microfinance context, research at the MFO–community 
interface is limited. We fill this research gap by focusing on clusters and 
peer groups at the community level of borrowers of HMI, since they 
shape accountability dynamics that occur internally within institutional 
boundaries. For example, borrowers use their personal connections, or 
form peer or solidarity groups, within a cluster; screen people; distinguish 
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‘good’ borrowers from ‘bad’ ones; ensure loan utilisation; and enforce 
repayment (Ghatak & Guinnane 1999). MFOs share information; collect 
loan repayments from borrowers during cluster meetings; and liaise 
with higher-level administration. Therefore, to examine the different 
types of accountability mechanisms within the MFI context, we need 
to adopt a typology that incorporates intra-organisational vertical and 
horizontal accountabilities.
Accountability framework
The principal-agent view is premised on the notion that individuals 
(principals) have their agendas carried out by other individuals (agents) 
(Ebrahim 2003b). In a corporate setting this is seen where management, 
as agents, act on behalf of the owners as shareholders. Therefore, the 
agency relationship can be at an individual or collective level. MFIs are 
accountable to multiple principals, such as funders, investors, regulators 
and beneficiaries (Ebrahim 2003b). In its relationship with external 
agencies (Dixon et al. 2006), the MFI is the agent. The MFI acts as 
principal as well as agent when addressing staff concerns and working 
with clients (Dixon et al. 2006). However, these vertical accountability 
relationships do not capture the unique relational dimension associated 
with microfinance lending. Nor do they take into account the more 
ethical stakeholder-scope accountability suggested by O’Dwyer and 
Unerman (2008). For example, microfinance loans are typically granted 
through peer or solidarity groups where a group, in addition to the 
individual, guarantee loans (Ledgerwood & Earne 2013). The presence 
and the use of diverse practices such as disclosure statements and reports, 
performance assessments and evaluations, participation, self-regulation 
and social auditing are used to enforce accountability to a range of 
stakeholders (Ebrahim 2003a, 2003b).
In the MFI context, the MFO is an agent for the MFI in a vertical 
relationship and a facilitator or principal in the horizontal relationship 
with borrowers. To overcome the difficulties of identifying a typical 
agency relationship and incorporating these important relational aspects, 
we use Ritchie and Richardson’s (2000) accountability framework, 
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developed for small business. Dixon et al. (2006) provided empirical 
evidence in their study in Zambia of the relationship between MFOs 
and joint liability credit groups and their ability to facilitate or manage 
competing priorities. In this paper, we also use Ritchie and Richardson’s 
(2000) typology to incorporate both vertical and horizontal accountability 
in a different lending paradigm, where MFOs formally engage borrowers 
at a community (cluster) level rather than at peer or solidarity level.
Ritchie and Richardson (2000) describe four forms of accountability – 
mandatory, contingent, compliant and collateral – to distinguish between 
vertical/hierarchical rule-based accountability and horizontal relational-
based accountabilities (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 Four types of accountability
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Type 1 – mandatory or codified accountability – is the most formal rule-
based and least discretionary form (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). These 
are clear, recognised rules that are adhered to impersonally against the 
set agenda of an organisation (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). However, 
if the process becomes over-formalised, compliance may not have any 
real effect, and results in ‘creative compliance’ (Ritchie & Richardson 
2000), or ‘construction of structures that comply with rules in form but 
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use it in unintended or unanticipated ways’ (McBarnet 2006: 1095). In a 
Zambian MFI, Dixon et al. (2006) found a strong Type 1 accountability 
to donors and external funders, since an institution is dependent on 
funding to support its resource position. In addition, ratings, audit and 
financial statement disclosure practices ensure strong accountability 
to external stakeholders, and in turn inf luence internal MFI practices 
(Hartarska 2009).
Next, Type 2 – contingent or bounded accountability – strongly 
combines both vertical and horizontal accountability associations, 
meaning rules are combined with more accepted customary practices 
(Ritchie & Richardson 2000). For example, in an organisational setting, 
executive management may set performance targets for benchmarking 
strategy goals but allow middle-level management discretion over how 
these are measured or achieved. Within MFIs, internal management 
uses rules and regulations, combined with relational aspects (Type 2), 
to ensure that branch and field level officers are accountable to the 
organisation (Dixon et al. 2007).
Type 3 – compliant or assumed accountability – weakly combines 
both vertical and horizontal accountability associations. Thus, Type 3 
accountability practices lack both formal rules and relational commitment 
(Ritchie & Richardson 2000). This is the potentially hidden side of Type 
1 accountability and acts as a cover and/or supplement for Type 1 
accountability practices. For example, this may occur when rules and 
procedures are weak on specific actions and the manager implements 
his or her own customary practices.
Finally, Type 4 – collateral or reciprocal accountability – relies upon 
the strength of mutual ties and relations (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). 
This is prominent within the microfinance sector, as clusters and/or 
peer groups are formed according to personal relationships and practices 
that exist beyond the rules and regulations (Dixon et al. 2006). For 
example, borrowers at peer-group level may rely on a mutual bond 
to repay each other’s loans, in order to prevent default at the cluster 
level. Social or cultural norms are often absent in formal rules that 
drive Type 1 and Type 2 accountabilities. However, in relational forms 
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of accountability, social or reputational loss has been demonstrated to 
drive strong commitment and accountability (Ranabahu 2017).
This study examines how these four types of accountabilities manifest 
at the MFO–community interface using the data collected from HMI. 
The next section explains the data collection and analysis method.
Method
This study is interpretive and uses a case study approach to ref lect the 
contextual and relational nature of accountability. The subjective and 
ref lective experiences of both the primary researcher and MFI officers 
and borrowers ‘in the field’ were used. The study was carried out using 
a rapid ethnographic approach: ‘a form of multi-method ethnography 
involving data collection from numerous sources over a relatively short 
period of time’ (Baines & Cunningham 2013: 74). Pink and Morgan 
(2013) point out that rapid ethnography is an alternative to conventional 
ethnography when studying research issues within a natural context. 
We selected this approach as it allowed us to gather ethnographic data 
within a natural context for a limited period in the field.
A rapid ethnography approach involves the primary researcher 
becoming familiar with the research context, and collecting data 
using multiple methods to compensate for the short time spent in 
the field. Since the primary researcher was a former employee of 
HMI, and skilled in the local language Sinhalese, she used modern 
communication methods (Skype, email and so on) to build rapport 
with HMI staff, before going to the selected branches. In addition, 
multiple data-collection tools (see Table 1) were used over a two-month 
period (December 2014 to January 2015) to explore empowerment – 
operationalised as entrepreneurship – as an outcome of microfinance 
services. The focus was on how entrepreneurs make decisions and 
acquire expertise using the products and services of HMI in particular, 
and a microfinance context more broadly. The data collected included 
institutional documents, observations, discussions with peer groups and 
clusters, individual interviews, and the primary researcher’s informal 
discussions and ref lections. Use of these multiple techniques during 
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the data-collection period also ref lects the ‘time deepening’ strategy 
of rapid ethnography.
The primary researcher visited HMI head office, four branches (one 
from each province in which HMI operates), clusters, peer groups and 
individuals to collect data. All the interviews and discussions were 
conducted in local languages (an interpreter was used for one interview 
with a Tamil-speaking person). All the interviews and discussions were 
later translated and transcribed into English.
Table 1 outlines the data-collection methods used at each level.
Table 1 Data-collection methods and details
Level Details
Organisational 
level
Head office • Document review (mainly operational manual 
and strategic plans of the MFI).
• Informal observations and researcher’s notes.
Branch • Researcher’s notes and informal observations.
MFO level • Informal discussions and researcher’s notes.
Cluster level • Three observations of cluster procedures. Each 
observation was conducted for 30–45 minutes by 
the primary researcher.1
• Two focus group discussions (FGDs) with cluster 
members were conducted. All focus group 
participants were borrowers of loans. Each focus 
group discussion lasted around twenty minutes.
• Researcher’s notes.
Peer group level • Three group discussions with peer group 
members who guarantee each other’s loans. The 
group discussions lasted around twenty minutes.
• Researcher’s notes.
Borrower level • Twenty-four interviews with microfinance borrowers 
who operate businesses. Each interview was 
conducted at the borrower’s business premises/
home and lasted 30 to 45 minutes.
1. In this study, the first author is the primary researcher.
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Since the researchers were interested in accountability practices at 
the MFO–community interface, we explored activities and policies of 
the MFI regarding: cluster formation and function; the role of cluster 
members and the cluster leader; peer groups and their function; and 
the MFO roles and responsibilities regarding cluster formation and 
operations. In addition, we explored the tasks carried out by MFOs at 
the cluster level, and compared them with the operational guidelines 
produced by HMI to contrast the level of engagement by MFOs with 
formal rules and procedures and the informal or customary practices 
used at the MFO–community interface. These findings are presented 
and discussed in the following section.
Accountability in practice
As Marini et al. (2017) argue, accountability is operationalised in practice 
and is therefore social and contextual. Our data highlights that MFIs and 
MFOs use clusters as avenues to enforce vertical accountability, and rely 
on borrowers’ relational ties to ensure horizontal accountability. The 
following section presents the findings according to the four typologies 
described earlier.
Type 1. Codified accountability: HMI formal rules and 
operational procedures
Mandatory or codified accountability is the most formal rules-based 
form of accountability (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). At the MFO–
community interface, HMI used clear and specific institutional rules 
and guidelines to ensure mandatory accountability from MFOs. 
These rules/guidelines covered activities related to cluster formation, 
management and evaluation, and the roles and responsibilities of 
MFOs. For example, MFOs mobilised individuals, formed clusters 
and explained the organisational vision, the lending mechanisms and 
loan features.
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It was explained that there should be three-member groups, then loans 
could be obtained, and there need to be 30 members per cluster; those 
were explained there [at the initial community gathering] (FGD 1).
At that gathering, they [HMI officers] explained that HMI has low-
interest-rate loans, the MFI was started by a foreign person who had 
money with the objective of improving the livelihood of poor people, and 
so on (Peer group discussion 2).
Beyond these tasks, MFOs were responsible for cluster functions. At 
cluster meetings, MFOs conducted a specific set of activities as outlined 
in the operational manual (such as religious observance, welcome, 
institutional announcements, discussion of a specific topic, and loan 
collection) and focused on providing convenient financial services to 
borrowers:
The officers themselves come and fill all the loan forms with us. They 
come and collect the instalments as well. So, we think this is convenient 
(Peer group discussion 3).
Operational aspects related to HMI emergency loans and hospitalisation 
benefit schemes were also handled by MFOs at the community interface.
Although the MFOs’ role included both borrower mobilisation/
facilitation and debt collection, priority was given to debt collection. 
This was visible during field observations, where some MFOs did not 
discuss a specific topic, as required by the operational manual:
Then, the MFO welcomed everyone and started the meeting. During 
that time, the MFO introduced me and mentioned that I am doing the 
study. Then the MFO started collecting the money . . . Towards the end 
of the meeting, the MFO mentioned that ‘regularly checking the eye 
sight is important’ and said that this is the daily topic. Only one sentence 
was said about the topic (Field notes, 3 December 2015).
Specifically in remote locations, MFOs considered time and their own 
priorities, and focused on debt collection. For example, as observed by 
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the main researcher, in one of the hilly areas the MFO only conducted 
debt-collection activities. When an inquiry was made as to why, the 
MFO mentioned that due to travelling difficulties and the time required 
to come to the remote location, there was not enough time for him to 
carry out all the cluster functions, as specified in the HMI operational 
manual. Since performance evaluation and bonuses related to credit 
services (such as disbursements and on-time debt collection), the MFOs 
focused on the completion of debt-related tasks.
To ensure mandatory (Type 1) accountability, HMI’s internal auditors 
monitored branch and cluster activities. They conducted regular branch 
audits to assess clusters and verify individual repayments against the 
branch records, and assessed MFOs’ activities. This was an observation 
made by the primary researcher at one of the branches (Field notes, 15 
December 2014). Therefore, HMI had rigorous procedures in place to 
safeguard its interests, and to evaluate whether MFOs carried out some 
of these tasks at the cluster level.
Type 2. Contingent accountability: HMI formal rules 
and procedures and socially sanctioned customary 
practices
Type 2, contingent or bounded accountability, combines both vertical and 
horizontal accountability associations strongly (Ritchie & Richardson 
2000). At the community interface, both MFOs and peer groups used 
contingent accountability practices.
MFOs
MFOs used a mix of formal strategies and ‘custom practices’ in debt 
collection. This is consistent with Ritchie and Richardson’s (2000) 
findings for contingent (Type 2) accountability. For example, MFOs 
used formal strategies, outlined in the operational manual, such as 
collecting money from borrowers during the cluster meeting. In case of 
non-repayment, the HMI operational manual required MFOs to send a 
formal letter, remind guarantors and even take legal action. However, in 
practice MFOs used their own strategies to ensure borrowers attended 
18 VOLUME 24 NUMBER 2 (2018)
cluster meetings and subsequently maintained loan repayments. For 
example, one MFO was firm about on-time cluster meeting attendance:
Some people are there, who attend the meeting when it is almost finish-
ing. Then, the officer is strict on that. We have been informed to arrive 
here, at least 1–2 minutes earlier (FGD 1).
As observed, a few MFOs did not start cluster meetings without the 
presence of all the cluster members. If these attendance standards were 
not met, there were social and financial implications for borrowers:
In HMI, attendance is compulsory. I could not attend the group meetings 
around two times. Then the officer as a punishment approved only 
30,000 [SLR] [though the maximum loan amount is 50,000 SLR] 
(Interviewee 19, a bra manufacturing business owner).
If the meeting has 30 members, all 30 or their representatives should be 
present. If not, the meeting will not start. Even for two hours, you have 
to wait until the members come. That is the punishment . . . There were 
instances where we had to wait. Few times . . . Once we had to wait 
one and a half hours for the meeting to begin. The meeting would not 
start until everyone is here (Peer group discussion 1).
Another MFO excluded cluster members and devised social penalties 
such as asking latecomers to wait outside the meeting premises (Field 
notes, 3 January 2015). When asked why, the branch manager and 
MFOs mentioned that customised strategies were required to maintain 
repayment discipline:
They [branch manager and the MFO] said that loan recovery takes time 
and too little is collected too late. They have to go a few times and it is 
not time- or cost-effective. If the officers insist on discipline and show 
that they are serious in loan repayments, then loan repayment culture 
improves. Then, it is easy in future (Field notes, 6 January 2015).
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Some of the strategies MFOs used were not an HMI requirement and 
did not appear in the operational guidelines, and so created incongruities 
between MFOs’ actions and MFI policies. Other strategies were 
interpreted differently. For example, microfinance borrowers could 
arrange for a representative to attend meetings:
When I asked for a loan, the meetings in HMI were also on Wednesdays. 
The payment day [ for the goods supplied] in Colombo was also 
Wednesday. I have to be at Colombo at that time . . . I could not arrange 
someone for around two days. Then, for the next round [of loans], I 
arranged a representative for the meeting. Now, I send one of the people 
working here [in her business] as my representative for the meeting 
(Interviewee 19, a bra manufacturing business owner).
As there was no clear direction about the age of a representative in the 
operational guidelines, it was observed that children under the age of 
sixteen were sometimes representatives for their parents (Field notes, 
2 January 2015).
These customised strategies need to be assessed within the context they 
operate. The findings highlight that a number of MFIs, in addition to 
HMI, operate in the same areas, and borrowers sometimes have multiple 
outstanding loans:
I have obtained a loan from Kanrich, then HMI and SEED Lanka [all 
MFIs]. I have a 100,000 rupees loan from Kanrich [MFI]. For that, I 
have to repay 2000 rupees as instalment for a week. I am in the second 
loan cycle (Interviewee 1, a vehicle upholstery business owner).
In these areas, multiple loan borrowers compared services, and this 
inf luenced the actions and activities of the MFOs, since borrowers were 
in a ‘take it or leave it’ position (Ebrahim 2003b):
The officer was saying to me [the primary researcher] that in the next 
area, since it is really close to the town, a number of microfinance 
institutions operate. That is a difficulty for them. Borrowers always 
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say that how other institutions conduct meetings such as attendance is 
not compulsory, how they can send money with someone else and repay 
the loan, etc. (Field notes, 3 December 2015).
This demonstrates that the type of strategies used to ensure loan 
repayments is a further consideration in the HMI context.
Peer groups
Peer groups, theoretically, demonstrate Type 2 (contingent) accountability, 
with both strong vertical and horizontal accountabilities. For example, 
peer groups are bound formally, through a loan contract, for loan 
repayment:
All three members have to pay back. So, their [HMI] rules are like that. 
If someone cannot pay back the instalments, the other two have to 
contribute and repay the loan. That’s how three members have signed 
the agreement. So, no one complains and everyone pays back 
(Interviewee 5, a garment seller).
This ref lects strong formal, rules-based accountability. However, in 
addition to the formal agreement, peer groups comprised of self-selected 
borrowers and were formed with the basic principle of solidarity; thus, 
they ref lect strong horizontal accountability. For these reasons, peer 
groups demonstrate Type 2 accountability at the MFO–community 
interface (see Type 4, collateral accountability, for more details).
Type 3. Assumed accountability: MFOs’ informal rules 
and taken-for-granted social norms
As Ritchie and Richardson (2000) explain, Type 3 (compliant or 
assumed) accountability weakly combines both vertical and horizontal 
accountability associations. This is evident in the way clusters were 
formed and functioned.
Clusters are informal community units without legal registration. 
There were no formal rules that legally bind all the cluster members 
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for loan repayment. Both cluster members and cluster leaders have 
limited and largely symbolic roles. For example, when asked at a focus 
group discussion to describe their responsibilities with regard to cluster 
meetings, borrowers responded with the following:
Borrower 1: To attend the meeting on time.
Borrower 2: Check the availability and accompany all three group 
members to the meeting.
Borrower 3: To repay the loans on time (FGD 2).
Therefore, cluster meetings were perceived as a way of ensuring on-time 
debt payment. Even the cluster leader’s responsibilities were confined 
to arranging meetings and facilitating the HMI meetings:
My role . . . Hmm . . . To check and verify whether all the members of 
the groups are present at the meeting. Sometimes, I have to inform about 
the meeting by going to houses. The leader should also arrange the 
meeting space, by placing chairs to conduct the meeting here. In addition, 
if the leader attends any meetings or any events, those details are shared 
with the members. If some documents are handed to distribute, those 
are given to other members (FGD 2).
However, in the absence of formal rules, informal practices were ‘norm’-
alised to become taken-for-granted informal rules. For example, although 
there was no HMI requirement for cluster members to be responsible for 
payments of members’ loans, they adhered to an informal expectation 
of repayment in cases of imminent default. At the cluster formation 
stage, and even during the cluster functions, MFOs verbally (informally) 
enforced loan repayment as a responsibility of cluster members:
In our cluster, there was once, that all the cluster members had to 
contribute money, as that member did not pay. If there is something 
like that, sir [the MFO] says that the group members should be account-
able to other person. The loan instalments of the other two group 
members are also not collected. Then, the three people have to somehow 
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find money, from somewhere, and repay the instalments (Interviewee 
8, a dressmaking business owner).
Therefore, vertical accountability was weak, and the informal rules 
shaping the accountability relationships at clusters allowed MFOs to 
create their own norms and expectations for the cluster.
While the use of informal rules could be perceived as evidence 
of strong relational accountability, this is not the case with Type 3. 
Horizontally, relational ties are weak at the cluster level, since borrowers 
have insufficient information to develop trust among members. In some 
cases, clusters were externally facilitated by MFOs and members. For 
example, when there were not enough borrowers to form a cluster, 
MFOs merged nearby clusters:
Here this meeting has attendance from two villages: RB2 and 6 Ela. 
Earlier there were two clusters. But, cluster members of both the villages 
were not enough, and the two clusters were merged. Now, there are 33 
members in the cluster (Peer group discussion 3).
However, the hidden side of Type 1 is evident in the tensions observed 
within clusters:
One member said that this [members not attending the meeting regularly] 
happened because previous staff member [MFO] merged two clusters; 
and the cluster members from the other village were not very reliable. 
Then, one person got offended and said not to generalise everyone 
(Observation note 1).
Cluster members accepted and complied with the MFO practices because 
of the power embedded in taken-for-granted norms and procedures. 
In this case, the potential for practices that foster empowerment are 
limited, since borrowers and MFOs perceive their relationship and 
responsibilities as merely debt-related.
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Type 4. Collateral accountability: Mutual ties in 
solidarity groups
Type 4 (collateral or reciprocal) accountability relies upon the strength 
of mutual ties and relations (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). In HMI, peer 
groups are formed with the basic principle of solidarity, which ref lects 
being held accountable for their actions. Borrowers trust each other to 
repay their loans in case of an emergency:
Initially, the [HMI] program informed us that we should have three 
members to obtain loans. That is the guarantee – the trustworthiness. 
Then we formed three-member groups with people we like. In my group, 
we still have the same members (Peer group discussion 3).
Some borrowers preserved trust and ensured loan repayments by 
including neighbours or extended family members in their peer groups. 
For example, interviewee 11 (the owner of a mobile toy, sweets and 
fruit business) had family members in his group, while interviewee 10 
(a pillowcase and cement f lowerpot business owner) chose neighbours 
for her group.
However, the strength of these relational ties varied. For example, 
peer groups with strong ties met to enquire whether loan repayments 
could be made (interviewee 10: a pillowcase and cement f lowerpot 
business owner), and contributed money for loan repayments in cases 
of need (interviewee 6: a confectionery business owner). In contrast, 
the primary researcher observed one peer group explaining to an MFO 
that they had problems in contacting one of their group members 
(Field notes, 11 December 2015). Hence, as explained, although Type 
2 accountability exists in peer groups, in practice Type 4 relational 
accountability is the driving force. In this study, being held to account 
for loan repayment included peers monitoring each other, with a strong 
social reputation dimension:
If I have any doubt that some members will not repay, this happened with 
XXX company once. There was a member [who did not repay], so I 
informed the field officer of the time when that person is at the house. So 
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the officer went to the home and stayed at the doorstep. Then the officer 
met the client to collect the money. That happened some time ago . . . In 
such cases, we assist the field staff. If someone does anything like that, 
it is not good. We do not allow anything like that to happen. Now we do 
not have anything like that (Interviewee 9, a mobile tea seller).
Therefore, peer groups used their social knowledge about each other 
in a close-knit community to ensure strong collateral accountability.
Discussion
This paper has examined types of accountability mechanisms and the 
way these different relationships manifest at the MFO–community 
interface. We have explored the cluster formation and functions, peer 
groups and their functions, and MFOs’ roles and responsibilities at the 
community interface at the level of practice. Our analysis demonstrates 
that multiple and complex accountability relationships manifest at 
this level. First, MFOs’ actions and tasks at community ref lect Type 1 
(codified) and Type 2 (contingent) accountability associations. MFOs’ 
roles and responsibilities are bound by MFI rules and guidelines, 
and practices embedded in these formal rules demonstrate Type 1 
accountability. MFOs are required to conduct both facilitation and 
debt-collection tasks, including visiting communities, establishing 
clusters, facilitating loan delivery, collecting loan instalments, providing 
a convenient service for rural people, and implementing the HMI vision. 
Aligning with NGO accountability mechanisms (Ebrahim 2003b), and 
consistent with monitoring and bonding costs associated with agency 
relationships, MFI management use performance-based compensation 
and branch monitoring to ensure Type 1 accountability.
Consistent with the findings of Siwale and Ritchie (2011), this study 
found that, beyond establishing clusters, MFO responsibilities were 
focused on debt collection rather than on fostering empowerment 
(and ultimately poverty alleviation). Hence, in organisations where 
dual objectives such as loan repayment and entrepreneurship exist, 
tensions arise. MFOs struggle to manage accountability to both the 
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institution and borrowers (Dixon et al. 2006), and inevitably MFOs may 
concentrate on their immediate survival as a priority (Siwale & Ritchie 
2011). Thus, hiring and socialisation policies are important to manage 
these tensions (Battilana & Dorado 2010). For example, Battilana and 
Dorado (2010) show that recruiting MFOs who have prior experience 
either of working with the poor or of banking led to tensions between 
lending tasks and development objectives in the long term, as these 
MFOs prioritised the activities they were comfortable with. In addition, 
the same authors found that recruiting relatively inexperienced MFOs 
and providing training to foster the organisational goals facilitated their 
dual roles and hybrid identity, at least in the short term.
Although MFI rules and guidelines shape MFOs’ roles and 
responsibilities, in practice MFOs use a mix of rules and ‘custom 
practices’ to ensure loan repayment (Type 2: contingent accountability). 
HMI expectations for MFOs differ from the traditional role of field 
officers in other MFIs – for example, limited activities related to 
community mobilisation and enterprise development, as they are 
handled by an EDO. At HMI, MFO performance is measured according 
to indicators associated with loan disbursements and on-time repayment. 
Thus, MFOs use bespoke strategies, unspecified in the operational 
manual, to enforce accountability for borrower actions related to 
attendance at cluster meetings and loan repayment. Although we did 
not find MFOs rearranging their daily tasks to recover loans from 
delinquent clients, as Dixon et al. (2007) did, our findings show that 
MFOs’ primary focus was on loan repayments at clusters. While MFO 
tasks may have been consistent with the objectives of HMI in practice, 
there are signs of incongruities between MFOs’ actions and the MFI’s 
mission, particularly in situations where MFOs bypass formal vertical 
accountability mechanisms that exist in rule compliance.
Nevertheless, the role of MFOs and accountability issues associated 
with their tasks need to be assessed within the context in which MFOs 
operate. The study highlights that, in some geographical areas, there are 
a number of MFIs in operation and borrowers may have multiple loans. 
In these areas, the actions and activities of the MFO were inf luenced 
by local exigencies. Ebrahim (2003b) argues that, in highly competitive 
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environments, clients have a stronger voice as they have a number of 
service providers to choose from. Hence, consistent with Ebrahim’s 
(2003b) argument, borrowers are empowered by the ‘take it or leave it’ 
position in relation to MFOs. Therefore, to maintain the borrower base 
and meet performance targets, MFOs adjust their practices beyond the 
standards or procedures set by HMI.
In addition to Type 1 and Type 2 accountability associations, 
MFOs act as both agent and principal, depending on the relationship. 
For example, MFOs implement institutional programs and provide 
services to borrowers; hence, MFOs act as agents for HMI. In addition, 
internal auditors assure that the interests of HMI are carried out by 
MFOs through monitoring. Furthermore, MFOs assume the role of 
the principal when dealing with borrowers, and so have the ‘right’ to 
demand an account from borrowers with regard to meeting attendance 
and loan repayment. Therefore, whether the MFO acts as the principal 
or agent in hierarchical relationships is defined by practices.
Type 3 and Type 4 accountability relationships also manifest at 
the MFO–community interface. For example, at the cluster level, 
although relational ties are weak, all members adhere to the norm of 
repaying a loan in cases of imminent default (Type 3 accountability). 
This is mainly because, in the absence of formal rules, verbally enforced 
informal practices are ‘norm’-alised and become the taken-for-granted 
unquestioned informal rules that shape accountability relationships and 
practices. These pseudo-rules are weak, though, as they are not legally 
binding. In addition, relational ties with Type 3 (assumed) accountability 
demonstrate a similar weakness, since MFOs prescribe the rules of 
cluster formation rather than develop socially sanctioned norms through 
engagement with cluster members. Within these clusters, borrowers lack 
sufficient information to develop strong trust relationships. Therefore, 
externally facilitated relational ties (such as merging clusters) cause 
social tensions that contribute to weak relational ties.
At the cluster level, members as well as leaders demonstrated limited 
responsibilities and opportunities for empowerment. Members were 
held to account only for continuous participation at cluster meetings 
and the maintenance of loan repayments, while cluster leaders merely 
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arranged meetings. The leadership role was often symbolic or tokenistic, 
as it did not increase the bargaining power of the cluster, and thus 
lacked political empowerment potential. Consistent with the findings 
of Bawole and Langnel (2016) and Walsh (2016), passive participation is 
a function of MFO time constraints and the imposition of bottom-up 
accountability practices.
As discussed, Type 4 (collateral) accountability relationships manifest 
at the peer or solidarity group level. Within peer groups, borrowers 
rely on trust; groups often consist of neighbours and family members. 
Peer group members contribute funds to repay loans that demonstrate 
strong relational ties. However, peer group members are also bound 
by a loan contract, so formal requirements are also evident. Therefore, 
while formal mechanisms exist, in practice strong relational ties within 
a peer group are dominant. The social monitoring and reputational 
loss as the penalty for non-payment at cluster-level meetings are strong 
motivators to draw on relational ties.
Conclusion
This study highlights several theoretical and empirical contributions 
to the accountability literature within the microfinance sector. First, 
this study is one of the first to explore accountability mechanisms 
that manifest at the MFO–community interface (particularly within 
clusters and peer groups). The study found that MFOs’ actions ref lect 
both codified and contingent accountability. That is, while MFOs are 
bound by MFI formal rules, in practice they use customised strategies 
to ensure debt collection, and a mix of strong vertical and horizontal 
accountabilities. In addition, this study demonstrates that clusters 
ref lect assumed accountability; that is, norms act as pseudo-rules 
when the mutual bond among cluster members is weak. Hence, both 
vertical and relational accountabilities are compromised at the cluster 
level. Finally, peer groups demonstrate both contingent and collateral 
accountability; that is, although group members are bound by a loan 
contract, in practice strong mutual ties shape individual actions. This 
study also demonstrates that relational accountability acts as a buffer 
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through customary or socially accepted practices, or taken-for-granted 
assumptions when hierarchical accountabilities are inadequate. Brown 
(2009: 314) recognises the need for new forms of accounting ‘that facilitate 
more participatory forms of decision-making and accountability’. In this 
case, forms of accountability that are empowering may need to include 
greater participation by borrowers at the cluster level.
Next, this study provides empirical evidence for accountability in the 
Sri Lankan microfinance context. Researchers have primarily focused 
on countries such as Bangladesh, Zambia, South Africa and Cameroon 
to study accountability mechanisms (see Dixon et al. 2006; Siwale & 
Ritchie 2011; Ahmed & Khan 2016; Akanga 2017; Marini et al. 2017). 
Our study extends the available evidence base from an under-researched 
context, and supports the applicability of Ritchie and Richardson’s (2011) 
accountability framework.
Third, this study illustrates that the empowerment potential in 
terms of entrepreneurial outcomes at the cluster level is limited. 
Although cluster members participated in meetings and repaid 
their loans, the tasks and activities associated with a cluster did not 
provide the skills or opportunities for borrowers to become expert 
entrepreneurs. While microfinance loans foster entrepreneurship, 
the practices of planning, developing ideas and managing challenges 
about business processes are important in entrepreneurial thinking 
(Ranabahu 2017). Therefore, thinking about a loan, cost-benefit analyses 
and opportunities for investment are not activities that occur at the 
point of debt collection, where borrowers only account for a monthly 
loan repayment. At the cluster level, participation occurs because of 
strong vertical accountability relationships, where HMI stipulates the 
roles and routine tasks of MFOs and members. In peer groups, where 
relational accountability is strong, on-time repayment through formal 
and informal accountability mechanisms is ensured, and the work of 
economic empowerment occurs. MFIs must ensure that empowerment is 
embedded in alternative ways besides peer groups. For example, training 
and capacity-building programs for MFI borrowers conducted by HMI 
enterprise development services or EDOs at the branch level enhance 
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economic empowerment potential, and participation in decision-making 
ensures social empowerment.
Fourth, this study demonstrates that accountability is defined by 
practices in the field. MFOs act as both the principal and agent, and 
adopt roles interchangeably depending on the task and associated 
accountability relationship. Thus, accountability is both contextual 
and practice-based. In addition, MFOs normalise informal practises 
in the long run that may create incongruities between MFOs’ actions 
and MFIs’ policies and overall social objectives. Similarly, MFOs adjust 
their actions when borrowers are in a stronger bargaining position 
and are politically empowered. Therefore, training programs and 
socialisation practices should examine why and how officers implement 
operational guidelines, and also consider the empowerment potential 
in relational forms of accountability consistent with the objectives of 
the MFI to mitigate the tensions of being caught between two worlds 
at the MFO–community interface.
Finally, future research in this area could focus on whether these 
accountability relationships exist in other types of microfinance 
lending models. One example, in India, is that of self-help groups – 
where groups save regularly, accumulate funds, manage accounts, 
and link with banks and other MFIs. This mechanism is different 
from the Grameen-type cluster-based lending by reinforcing relational 
accountability associations. Hence, exploring the way accountability 
relationships manifest at the borrower level with different microfinance 
lending models assists in future policy formation and MFI practices in 
the field. Furthermore, studies involving other products and services 
beyond microfinance, such as micro-savings, micro-insurance and 
micro-leasing, could generate further insights into the management 
of complex accountability relationships. Finally, the management of 
vertical and relational accountability when MFIs use new technologies, 
such as mobile payments or agent banking, that limit the role and 
power of MFOs provides an interesting example of non-human agents 
in accountability relationships.
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NOTES
1. A pseudonym.
2. HMI is owned by its parent NGO. While it is a not-for-profit entity, it does 
have a commercial focus.
3. ‘Portfolio-at-risk’ is the value of all loans outstanding that have one or more 
instalments past due by more than a certain number of days (CGAP 2003). 
In this case, it is one day and 30 days, respectively.
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